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Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.: The Rock, the
Hard Place, and the Insurance Defense Attorney
A consumer buying an insurance policy expects that the insurer will pay
claims that arise under the policy and defend the insured in court if necessary.
The policyholder is not likely to consider who will provide legal representation
in the defense of a claim or what that attorney's relationship will be to the insurer'-whether the attorney will be from the insurer's staff, a private attorney
2
hired and controlled by the insurer, or an attorney selected by the insured.
These distinctions, however, can prove important in situations in which the insured's interests conflict with the insurer's and in which the insured seeks to
assert rights against the insurer relating to the quality of the defense.
Recently in Brown v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. 3 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that an attorney hired by an insurance company was
an independent contractor 4 and that the insurer therefore was not vicariously
liable for the attorney's negligence. 5 This Note examines Brown, analyzing first
the relationship between insurer, insured, and attorney and second the responsibilities that arise from this relationship. The Note examines North Carolina's
established principles of agency and independent contractors and attempts to
place the relationship within these defined frameworks. The Note concludes
that, contrary to the court's pronouncement in Brown, the relationship between
attorney and insurer should be considered one of agency when the insurance
company exerts control in the defense of the policyholder.
In Brown Doyle Brown and his wife were sued by Joan Hinson as a result of
a car accident. The Browns' insurance company, Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Company (LMCC), employed the law firm of Tuggle, Duggins, Meschan &
Elrod to defend the Browns pursuant to their insurance contract. 6 The Browns
claimed that their brakes had been designed defectively by the car's manufacturer, General Motors Corporation (GMC). The law firm filed an answer denying any negligence on the part of the Browns. 7 The answer, however, did not
contain a claim against GMC as a third-party defendant. At this point, the
Browns' attorneys-against the Browns' wishes but at the direction of LMCCoffered settlement in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars, the policy
1. The relationship between the policy holder, the insurer, and the attorney hired by the insurer is a unique one: "[i]n no other instance is a litigant represented by an attorney who is selected
and paid by a third party which may have interests adverse to the client." Weithers, The Coverage
Role of Defense Counsel, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 156, 156 (1981). In most cases, however, the policy
holder and insurer have a common interest in resolving the litigation. Id.
2. In North Carolina, the prohibition on the practice of law by corporations prevents insurance companies from defending policyholders with staff attorneys. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 314 S.E.2d 517 (1986)).
3. 90 N.C. App. 464, 369 S.E.2d 367, disc. rev. granted in part, 323 N.C. 363, 373 S.E.2d 542
(1988).
4. Id. at 471, 369 S.E.2d at 371.
5. Id. at 473, 369 S.E.2d at 372; see infra text accompanying note 22.
6. Brown, 90 N.C. App. at 466, 369 S.E.2d at 368.
7. Id.
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limit.8 When Hinson refused this offer, LMCC made a payment of twenty-five
thousand dollars to Hinson to secure a release of its obligation pursuant to section 1-540.3 of the North Carolina General Statutes.9 LMCC subsequently terminated the Browns' defense and discharged the law firm. 10 The firm withdrew
as counsel and informed the Browns that they should employ their own attorney."1 The Browns did not hire counsel and the court subsequently entered a
forty-five thousand dollar judgment against them, crediting to defendants the
twenty-five thousand dollar payment to plaintiff under the insurance policy. 12
The Browns brought an action against GMC and LLMC, asserting three
claims. First, the Browns alleged fraud 13 and products liability against GMC. 14
Second, they made a claim against LMCC for the negligence of the law firm,
alleging that the firm failed to include a products liability claim against the manufacturer in the original action before the statute of repose had run. 15 Third, the
Browns asserted that LMCC was obligated to provide a defense even after paying the limit on the policy.1 6 The trial court dismissed plaintiffs' claims on each
of the three issues.17
The North Carolina Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Greene, affirmed dismissal of the products liability action against GMC, finding it was
initiated after the period of repose had expired.' 8 The court, however, did allow
the fraud claim based on GMC's alleged representation that it would defend the
Browns' interests. 19 The court refused to impute the law firm's alleged negligence to LMCC, holding that the firm was an independent contractor of the
insurance company. 20 Finally, the court ruled that because the terms of the
insurance contract were ambiguous, the insurance company had a duty to de21
fend the insured despite having paid the policy limit.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 466-67, 369 S.E.2d at 368. The statute provides for advance payments to an injured
person by a party, or that party's insurance carrier, against whom a claim may be asserted. Such a
payment does not, in itself, discharge any claims of the person receiving payment. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-540.3(a) (1983).
10. Brown, 90 N.C. App. at 467, 369 S.E.2d at 368.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 467, 369 S.E.2d at 368-69.
13. Id. at 467, 369 S.E.2d at 369. The Browns alleged that an employee of GMC deceptively
represented that GMC would provide counsel for their defense in the Hinson case. Id. at 469-70, 369
S.E.2d at 370.
14. Id. at 467, 369 S.E.2d at 369.
15. Id. at 467, 471, 369 S.E.2d at 369, 371. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (1983) ("No action
for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death or damage to property based upon or arising
out of any alleged defect or any failure in relation to a product shall be brought more than six years
after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption.").
16. Brown, 90 N.C. App. at 467, 369 S.E.2d at 369.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 468, 369 S.E.2d at 369.
19. Id. at 470, 369 S.E.2d at 370-71.
20. Id. at 473, 369 S.E.2d at 372.
21. Id. at 477, 369 S.E.2d at 374. The court considered the insurance policy ambiguous on
whether the duty to defend continues after the policy limit is paid and thus construed the language of
the policy against the drafter. Id. at 476, 369 S.E.2d at 374. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
granted review on this issue. Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 323 N.C. 363, 373 S.E.2d
542 (1988).
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The court's decision to declare the law firm an independent contractor of
the insured was directly related to the decision not to hold the company vicari-

ously liable for the alleged negligence. Generally, an employer is not liable for
torts committed by an independent contractor. 22 The employer may be held
liable, however, if the duty between the employer and the contractor is nondele-

gable, 23 if the activity delegated is inherently dangerous, 24 or if the employer

was negligent in hiring the independent contractor. 2 5 On the other hand, when
the employer controls the work performed by a party, that party is an agent of
the employer, who is thus vicariously liable for torts committed within the scope
26
of the agent's employment.
North Carolina courts have distinguished carefully the relationship between

an employer and independent contractor from the employer's relationship with
an agent or employee, relying primarily on an analysis of the degree of control
exerted by the employer. The North Carolina Supreme Court developed a list of
factors to be considered in determining the nature of an employment relationship in Hayes v. Board of Trustees of Elon College.2 7 In Hayes defendant's busi-

ness manager hired several off-duty power company employees to replace
electrical poles, providing a truck and two helpers. The workers were instructed
where to place the new poles and to shorten them to avoid interference with
nearby trees.2 8 In finding that they were independent contractors, the court fo-

cused on the interaction between the workers and the employers: "[T]he retention by the employer of the right to control and direct the manner in which the

details of the work are to be executed and what the laborers shall do as the work
22. Hendricks v. Leslie Fay, Inc., 273 N.C. 59, 62, 159 S.E.2d 362, 365 (1968) (quoting W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 70 (3d ed. 1964)); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 409 (1965).
23. Hendricks, 273 N.C. at 62-63, 159 S.E.2d at 366 (duties relating to contract with security
guard held nondelegable). If the duty is nondelegable, the contractor will have the status of an
agent. Id. at 62, 159 S.E.2d at 366.
24. Deitz v. Jackson, 57 N.C. App. 275, 279-81, 291 S.E.2d 282, 285-86 (1982) (no showing
that the use of a ramset gun for construction work was inherently dangerous); see also Dockery v.
World of Mirth Shows, Inc., 264 N.C. 406, 410, 142 S.E.2d 29, 32 (1965) ("where it is reasonably
foreseeable that harmful consequences will arise from the activity of the [independent] contractor
unless precautionary methods are adopted, the duty rests upon the employer to see that these precautionary methods are adopted and he cannot escape liability by entrusting this duty to an independent contractor").
25. Deitz, 57 N.C. App. at 278, 291 S.E.2d at 285.
26. Vaughn v. Department of Human Resources, 296 N.C. 683, 686, 252 S.E.2d 792, 795
(1979).
27. 224 N.C. 11, 16, 29 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1944). The court stated that an independent contractor relationship exists when
[t]he person employed (a) engaged in an independent business, calling, or occupation; (b) is
to have the independent use of his special skill, knowledge, or training in the execution of
the work; (c) is doing a specified piece of work at a fixed price or for a lump sum or upon a
quantitative basis; (d) is not subject to discharge because he adopts one method of doing
work rather than another; (e) is not in the regular employ of the contracting party; (f) is
free to use such assistants as he may think proper; (g) has full control over such assistants;
and (h) selects his own time.
Id.
28. Id. at 14, 29 S.E.2d at 139.
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progresses is decisive ....,,29 The court found, over a strong dissent, 30 that the
directives to cut the poles to avoid the trees, while of "some consideration," did
not rise to the level of control over details that would make the laborers employ31

ees of defendant.
The supreme court has, however, found an agency relationship in circumstances where control was arguably less apparent. In Vaughn v. Department of

Human Resources,32 for example, the court ruled that North Carolina's Social

Services Commission of the Department of Human Resources was liable for the

negligence of the Durham County Director of Social Services in his placement of
foster children. 33 Although the Commission had no role in the actual placement

of foster children, the court found it implicitly had exerted control merely by
promulgating generalized rules. First, in making placement decisions, the

County Director was required to "comply with the rules and regulations of the
Social Services Commission" as provided by statute. 34 The court noted that the

commission in fact had developed comprehensive guidelines for the licensing
and inspection of foster homes and placement of children in them.35 Second, the
Department of Human Resources used its funding power to influence the
County Director's placement practices. 36 To receive reimbursement funds, the

County Director was required to place foster children in licensed homes that

met the standards prescribed by the Commission. 37 Finally, while the Commission did not have the exclusive power to hire, discharge, or compensate the

county director, it did have "some influence" on personnel decisions through its
minority representation on the County Board of Social Services. 38 The court
concluded that "the Department of Human Resources through the Social Serv-

ices Commission ha[d] the right to control the manner in which the County
Director ...place[d] children in foster homes ... [and, therefore, was] liable
under the rule of respondeatsuperiorfor the negligent acts of the County Direc29. Id. at 15, 29 S.E.2d at 139-40.
30. The dissent's definition of an independent contractor, one who "contracts to do a piece of
work according to his own judgment and methods, without being subject to his employer except as
to the results of the work," similarly focused on control. Id. at 20, 29 S.E.2d at 143 (Devin, .,
dissenting). However, the dissent viewed the degree of instruction given by the employer, combined
with the employer's supplying all the tools and materials, as sufficient to represent control. Id. at 22,
29 S.E.2d at 144 (Devin, J.,
dissenting).
31. Id. at 18, 29 S.E.2d at 142. The supreme court continues to have difficulty applying the
Hayes factors to distinguish an independent contractor from an employee. See, eg., Youngblood v.
North State Ford Truck Sales, 321 N.C. 380, 364 S.E.2d 433 (1988) (the court, divided four to three,
held that a person hired to instruct employees in the use of specialized equipment was an employee
under the Hayes factors).
32. 296 N.C. 683, 252 S.E.2d 792 (1979).
33. Id. at 690-91, 252 S.E.2d at 797.
34. Id. at 687, 252 S.E.2d at 795.
35. Id. at 687-88, 252 S.E.2d at 795-96. The standards covered, for example, the circumstances
that require the separation of a child from his or her natural parents, the characteristics of a suitable
foster home, the types of food, clothing, and medical care that must be provided, and the manner of
evaluating foster care. Id. at 687, 252 S.E.2d at 796.
36. Id. at 688, 252 S.E.2d at 796.
37. Id. at 688-89, 252 S.E.2d at 796.
38. Id. at 691, 252 S.E.2d at 798.
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The nature of the relationship between an insurer and the attorney hired to
represent the policyholder had been considered, albeit indirectly, in one North

Carolina decision prior to Brown. In Gardnerv. North CarolinaState Bar 40 the
supreme court reviewed a Bar ethics opinion that prohibited insurance compa-

nies from using their own "house counsel" to represent policyholders. 41 The
petitioner urged that the distinction "between 'house' and 'outside independent

counsel'" was arbitrary and thus unlawful. 42 The Bar claimed, and the court
held, that use of attorneys employed by the insurer to represent insureds would

43
constitute the practice of law by a corporation, which is forbidden by statute.

In making the distinction between outside attorneys hired by the insurer and

staff counsel, the court focused on the persona of the party providing the legal
representation. 44 When a staff attorney provides legal services, the court ob39. Id. at 690-91, 252 S.E.2d at 797. The court illustrated that these cases turn on close analyses of facts to determine whether control was exerted by finding Turner v. Board of Educ., 250 N.C.
456, 109 S.E.2d 211 (1959), "factually distinguishable." Vaughn, 296 N.C. at 691, 252 SE.2d at
798. In Turner the court ruled that the State Board of Education did not have the authority to
control the lawn mower operator hired by the local school district and thus could not be held vicariously liable. Turner, 250 N.C. at 462-63, 109 S.E.2d at 216.
The control issue also has arisen in the relationship between hospitals and medical personnel.
Compare Willoughby v. Wilkins, 65 N.C. App. 626, 635, 310 S.E.2d 90, 96 (1983) (agency relationship found despite a statement in the doctor's contract that he was an independent contractor), disc.
rev. denied, 310 N.C. 631, 315 S.E.2d 697 (1984) with Smock v. Brantley, 76 N.C. App. 73, 75-76,
331 S.E.2d 714, 716 (1985) (doctor deemed an independent contractor because, unlike Willoughby,
no elaborate contract controlled the details of the physician's work), disc. rev. denied, 315 N.C. 590,
341 S.E.2d 30 (1986).
40. 316 N.C. 285, 341 S.E.2d 517 (1986).
41. Id. at 288-89, 341 S.E.2d at 519-20. The ethics opinion provided in part that
[ilt would be unethical for a full time salaried employee of an insurance company, who is
an attorney licensed to practice in the State of North Carolina, to appear as counsel of
record in an action brought against an insured by a third party for a claim covered by the
terms of the insurance policy or to appear in the prosecution of subrogation claims for the
property damage unless such actions are defended or prosecuted only in the name of the
insurance company and the insurance company assumes or is subrogated to the complete
legal liability and pecuniary interest of the claim. Independent counsel must be retained
for the insured when he is the named defendant or plaintiff and thereby the real party in
interest....
The attorney's paramount responsibility is to the court and client which he serves
before the court. This responsibility should not be influenced by any other entity. When an
attorney, who is employed by a corporation, is directed by his employer in the representation of other individual litigants, he is subject to the direct control of his employer, which is
not itself the litigant and which is not itself subject to strict professional discipline as an
officer of the court. This diluted responsibility to the court and the client must be avoided.
N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., CPR Op. 326 (Oct. 21, 1982), reprintedin 7 N.C. STATE BAR NEwsLETTER 7 (Dec. 2, 1982) (quoted in Gardner, 316 N.C. at 288-89, 341 S.E.2d at 519).
42. Gardner,316 N.C. at 287, 341 S.E.2d at 518.
43. Id. at 298-90, 341 S.E.2d at 520; see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 84-5 (1985) ("It shall be unlawful
for any corporation to practice law or appear as an attorney for any person in any court in this
State .... ). In Gardnerthe Bar also claimed that the suggested practice would increase the risk of a
conflict of interest. Gardner,316 N.C. at 289, 341 S.E.2d at 519. Having decided for the Bar on the
ground that allowing employees in the scope of their employment to represent insureds would be the
unlawful practice of law by a corporation, the court declined to consider the conflict of interest
argument. Id. at 295, 341 S.E.2d at 523. For a more detailed exposition of the Gardnerdecision, see
Note, The UnauthorizedPracticeof Law by Corporations: North CarolinaHolds the Line, 65 N.C.L.
REv. 1422 (1987).
44. Gardner, 316 N.C. at 292-93, 341 S.E.2d at 521-22.
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served, the insurer is the actor. 45 The court expressly assumed, however, that an
outside attorney would be an independent contractor; thus, the attorney alone
would be the actor in the ensuing litigation. 4 6 Although this assumption was
helpful in obtaining the desired result, the court made it without considering the
degree of control exerted by.the insurer over the outside attorney. 47

The relationship between insurer, insured, and attorney may be established
in three ways. Each method raises issues of conflict of interest 48 and of vicarious
liability. First, although prohibited in North Carolina, many states allow insurance companies to employ staff attorneys to defend insurance claims. 49 In this

situation, courts have held the insurer vicariously liable for the attorney's ac-

tions.50 Such organization raises compelling ethical questions in conflict of interest situations51 and should be limited to situations in which there is no
52
question of coverage and in which the claim is within policy limits.

A second form of the relationship is also clear cut. Several courts mandate
that in conflict situations the policyholder be permitted to hire an attorney who
will be paid by the insurance company.5 3 This reduces the possibility of improper ties between the insurer and the attorney. The absence of control also
negates an agency relationship; therefore, the insurer cannot be held vicariously
liable for the attorney's negligence. 5 4 This solution, not surprisingly, is not popular with insurance companies because it impinges on their contractual right to
direct the litigation.5 5 Without control, it has been asserted, the insurer cannot
investigate the lawsuit to make an "honest, intelligent, and knowledgeable evalu'56
ation of the claim for purposes of settlement negotiations."
45. Id. at 292, 341 S.E.2d at 522.
46. Id. at 293, 341 S.E.2d at 522.
47. See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). When the insurer and

policyholder have conflicting interests, legal representation should be arranged to ensure counsel's
"professional independence." Id. Rule 1.7 comment (Interest of Person Paying For a Lawyer's Service); see infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 950-51 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (explicitly
declining to follow Gardner).
50. See Bevevino v. Saydjari, 76 F.R.D. 88, 93 n.4, 94 n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 574 F.2d
676 (2d Cir. 1978); Allstate, 722 S.W.2d at 953.
51. As a dissenting justice in Allstate remarked, "[A]nyone who believes that in conflict of
interest situations, a salaried lawyer employee of Allstate would not place the welfare of the corporation above that of the policy holder, who theoretically he represents, probably also believes in the
Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny." Allstate, 722 S.W.2d at 959 (Greene, S.J., dissenting).
52. See id. at 951. It also has been asserted that when the independence of staff counsel is
preserved, the appearance of impropriety created is not in itself sufficient to warrant disqualification.
Mallen, A New Definition of Insurance Defense Counsel, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 108, 112 (1986). An
opinion on a coverage issue given by the staff counsel to the insurer, however, would warrant disqualification. Id.
53. See, e.g., Klein v. Salama, 545 F. Supp. 175, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). It has been suggested
that the insurer, if it wishes, should be permitted to select outside counsel to control the defense.
This solution takes the control of the defense from the insurer without giving it to the policyholder.
A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPUTES § 420, at 178-79 & n.172 (2d ed. 1988).
54. A. WINDT, supra note 53, § 420, at 178-79, § 438, at 219.
55. See Allstate, 722 S.W.2d at 952.
56. Duty to Defend Exists Where InsuredAdmits He Intentionally Injured a Third Party and
Surrounding Circumstances Indicate InsuredActed in Self Defense, 8 INS. LIT. RPTR. (Miller Freeman) 1055, 1056 (1986).
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The third type of relationship-exemplified in Gardner- is more complex.
Here, the insurer hires outside counsel to represent the policyholder's interests
while retaining control of the defense.5 7 There is a split of authority in such
cases. Some courts deem the attorney an independent contractor; 58 others consider the attorney's actions a component of the duty to defend and impose an
agency relationship.5 9
An early case examining the nature of this three-way relationship was
Smoot v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.6 In Smoot the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to allow an insurance company to escape liability for the negligence of an attorney it hired to defend the
policyholder. 6 1 The court reasoned that the insurance policy implicitly created
a duty to provide an adequate defense.6 2 Hiring outside counsel did not absolve
the insurer of this duty when the attorney, though not incompetent, damaged
the insured through negligence or bad faith. 63 The court expressly refused to
designate the attorney an independent contractor, stating that "[t]hose whom
the Insurer selects to execute its promises, whether attorneys, physicians, no less
than company-employed adjusters, are its agents for whom it has customary
legal liability." 64 By contrast, the court in Merritt v. Reserve Insurance Co. 65
rejected Smoot's implication that an insurance policy imposes a nondelegable
duty on the insurer to present an adequate defense. 66 Here, the California Court
of Appeal noted that because the insurance company was not permitted to ap67
pear in court, all parties understood that the duty to defend was delegable.
Nevertheless, subsequent decisions in other jurisdictions have tended to follow
68
the Smoot analysis.
The Brown court was not oblivious to this contrary authority. It recognized
that other jurisdictions had reached a different conclusion in determining the
nature of the relationship between an insurer and the attorney it hires. 69 Nevertheless, the court perfunctorily stated that it was bound by "traditional agency
principles" and by the recent Gardner decision. 70 It is not clear, however, that
57. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
58. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 62-63.
60. 299 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1962).
61. Id. at 530.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citations omitted).
65. 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511 (1973).
66. Id. at 881, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
67. Id. at 880-81, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
68. Cases following Smoot include: Boyd Bros. Transp. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 729
F.2d 1407, 1410-11 (lth Cir. 1984); Brinkley v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 1283,
1286 (10th Cir. 1973); Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 294 (Alaska
1980); Petersen v. Farmers Cas. Co., 226 N.W.2d 226, 228-29 (Iowa 1975). While North Carolina is
the only jurisdiction to follow the Merritt rationale expressly, Merritt has been favorably cited by
commentators. See, eg., 7 C J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4687, at 192-93 (rev.
ed. 1979); A. WINDT, supra note 53, § 4.38, at 220.
69. Brown, 90 N.C. App. at 472-73, 369 S.E.2d at 372.
70. Id. at 471, 369 S.E.2d at 371.
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traditional principles and precedent mandated such a result. First, the court correctly noted that in North Carolina "a principal's vicarious liability for the torts
of his agent depends on the degree of control retained by the principal over the
details of the work as it is being performed. The controlling principle is that
vicarious liability arises from the right of supervision and control."17 ' In contrast
to most North Carolina cases determining the nature of employment, 7 2 however, the Brown court did not examine closely the underlying relationship between the parties, 73 a remarkable omission given the intricate legal and ethical
problems the situation presents. In fact, insurers generally, as LMCC here, retain a great deal of control over litigation even when outside counsel is hired.74
This includes control over trial preparation, expenses, expert witnesses, and discovery, as well as the ultimate authority on whether to settle. 75 Illustrative of
the insurer's control in Brown was the attorney's recommendation to LMCC
that the company pay the policy limit 76 and LMCC's subsequent instruction to
the attorney to offer judgment and withdraw from the case 7 7 despite LMCC's
78
continuing duty to provide a defense under the terms of the insurance policy.
Second, in following the approach taken in Merritt, the court went beyond
the scope of that decision. In Merritt the court found no conflict between the
interests of the insurer and insured-they were parallel at all times. 79 In Brown,
because the amount of the claim was far in excess of the amount of LMCC's
coverage, a vigorous defense-one that asserted all possible claims and defenses-was critical to the Browns. The insurance company was likely to lose
twenty-five thousand dollars regardless of the action taken. In contrast to the
Browns, then, the insurance company's interest in defending the claims was not
80
great. Several courts have declined to follow Merritt for this very reason.

Third, the court's reliance on Gardner is questionable. In Gardner the
State Bar asserted that there was no difference in substance between hiring an
outside attorney to conduct the litigation and delegating it to a staff attorney. 8 '
The court rejected this argument, noting that in the latter situation the insurance
71. Id. at 471-72, 369 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Hayman v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 86 N.C. App. 274,
277, 357 S.E.2d 394, 397, disc rev. denied, 320 N.C. 631, 360 S.E.2d 87 (1987)).
72. See supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
73. The court, without providing a factual analysis, found that although LMCC "controlled the
ultimate decision to settle or defend under the policy," it saw no evidence that the insurer had
"control over the details of the litigation." Brown, 90 N.C. App. at 472, 369 S.E.2d at 371.
74. See Note, supra note 43, at 1433.
75. In re Allstate Ins. Co., 722 S.W.2d 947, 952 (Mo. 1987) (en bane); see Note, supranote 43,
at 1433; C. WOOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.4.1, at 428 (1986).
76. Record at 29, Brown v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 90 N.C. App. 464, 369 S.E.2d 367
(No. 8722SC426), disc. rev. granted in part, 323 N.C. 363, 373 S.E.2d 542 (1988).
77. Brown, 90 N.C. App. at 466-67, 369 S.E.2d at 368.
78. Id. at 477, 369 S.E.2d at 374.
79. Merritt v. Reserve Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 858, 877, 110 Cal. Rptr. 511, 524 (1973).
80. See, e.g., Continental Ins. Co. v. Bayless & Roberts, Inc., 608 P.2d 281, 294 (Alaska 1980).
The conflict in Bayless was more egregious. The policyholder's attorney recommended that the
insurer send a reservation of rights letter to the insured and subsequently drafted it. He also contacted the insurer for permission before taking certain actions. Id.
81. Gardner v. North Carolina State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 292, 341 S.E.2d 517, 521 (1986).
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company is the actor. With the outside attorney conducting the litigation, however, the insurer
does not purport to defend or represent its insureds itself. It agrees to
furnish a defense and carries out its obligation by paying an independent attorney, assumedfor the purpose of this opinion to be an independent contractor,to represent its insureds. It also has certain contractual
rights, supported by its pecuniary interest, to select this attorney and
to have some control over the suit. Nevertheless, the independent attorney 8is2 the "actor" who provides legal representation for the
insured.
Gardner's assumption that an outside attorney would be an independent contractor does little to answer the question, however. The court, for example, did
not examine the nature of the relationship to determine the degree of control
over the manner and method of the work, the traditional agency test.8 3 In fact,
the court indicated that the insurer has the right "to have some control" over
the litigation, a conclusion that belies the assumption that the attorney is an
independent contractor. Furthermore, when viewed in context, it is apparent
that this assumption was made only to highlight the fact that if a house counsel
defends the insured, the insurer itself is the actor providing the legal services.
While delegating the defense to an outside attorney very well may create a new
4
actor for the purpose of avoiding the illegal practice of law by a corporation, it
does not necessarily limit the insurer's control of the litigation.
Thus, the court's decision in Brown that an attorney hired by an insurance
company to defend the insured is an independent contractor was not as well
grounded in existing law as the court suggested. First, the court ignored the
weight of authority in this area, choosing instead to follow dicta in Gardner.
Second, the court failed to recognize the insurer's control over the litigation, a
factor that traditional agency principles would have deemed sufficient to establish an agency relationship. Clearly, the insurer does not want to give up control, and this should not be required under the circumstances of Brown, because
lack of control will hamper both the insurer's investigation and its coverage decisions. To retain control, however, the insurer must sacrifice the independent
contractor status of the attorney it hired, thus subjecting the company to vicarious liability for that attorney's negligence in the policyholder's defense.
The ethical responsibilities of the defense attorney are of paramount concern in situations where the interests of the insurer and policyholder diverge.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit a lawyer from representing
clients with directly adverse interests. 85 A comment notes that a liability insur82. Id. at 292-93, 341 S.E.2d at 522 (emphasis added).
83. See supra text accompanying note 29.
84. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
85. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (1983). The rule states in full:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client will be directly
adverse to another client, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the
relationship with the other client; and
(2) each client consents after consultation.
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ance agreement may create conflicting interests between the insurer and insured,
but requires only that "the arrangement ... assure the special counsel's professional independence." 8 6 While these rules do not provide specific standards of
behavior, it is reasonably clear that if87the defense attorney must align herself
with one party it must be the insured.
Because the policyholder still may maintain a negligence action directly
against the defense attorney-who generally will have her own malpractice insurance-the court's failure to impute the attorney's negligence to the insurance
company will make little difference to the policyholder in a majority of claims.
Only where the damages exceed the limit of the attorney's malpractice insurance
will a complete recovery be endangered. The burden of the Brown decision falls
not on the policyholder, but on the insurance defense attorney and her malpractice insurer. As an independent contrictor the attorney is liable for any negligence; the insurance company, despite exerting significant control and assuming
a share of the risk in the defense, will escape responsibility. At its next opportunity the court should examine the ethical and legal issues in the complex relationship between the insurer, attorney and policyholder. This examination
should include a factual analysis of the degree of control the insurer actually
asserts in the litigation before placing it in an established framework of agency
or independent contractor. Finally, the court should reconsider the position declared in Brown and treat an attorney hired by an insurer as its agent where the
insurer has exerted control over the litigation.
JAMES

D.

FREEMAN

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the
lawyer's own interests, unless:
(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected;
and
(2) the client consents after consultation. When representation of multiple clients in
a single matter is undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the advantages and risks involved.
Id.
86. Id. comment (Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service). A related provision states:
"[A] lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than
the client unless: (1) the client consents after consultation; (2) there is no interference with
the lawyer's independence of professional judgement or with the client-lawyer relationship;
and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by rule 1.6
[regarding confidentiality).
Id. Rule 1.8(f).
87. C. WOOLFRAM, supra note 75, § 8.4.1, at 429 (1986).

